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Pakistan offers very unique political culture featured by deeply entrenched 
security-dominated worldview and concrete processes of behaviours in all 
spheres of the country’s politics. One of the most remarkable 
characteristics of Islamabad’s official rhetoric is the persistently 
formulated claim of the existence of a ‘foreign hand’ in all kinds of the 
internal issues. However, there are clear indications that most of these 
flashpoints are of colonial origin and/or are ‘homemade’. The unfortunate 
trajectories present in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 
Pakistan’s most fragile, underdeveloped, and war-torn areas, can be seen 
as an example par excellence of how conflicts inherited by former colonial 
ruler turned worse due to a bad governance, geo-political considerations, 
and partisan economic interests of the national elite after gaining 
independence. However, in order to reverse these unfortunate trajectories 
within the FATA, it seems that the so-called establishment is finally 
convinced to carry out a substantial and sustainable reform for this 
disadvantaged region. But this is only a part of the whole story. It can be 
argued that the current FATA reform efforts must be put in a correlation 
with the ongoing China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 
implementation. In addition, the FATA reform process is not only about 
reconciliation, reconstruction, improvement of the social and economic 
conditions, and political transformation of the area into a ‘post-conflict 
scenario’, but it is also about ‘making FATA fit for CPEC’. In other words, 
the reforms have to make sure that FATA will not become a roadblock for 
an effective implementation of the envisaged economic corridor. 
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Introduction: Contextualizing of FATA and CPEC 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion dollar infrastructure 
investment project, is heralded as a ‘game changer’ for the Pakistan’s economy and regional 
cooperation (Daily Capital 2015, October 2; Fazil 2016, May 29; Sahgal 2015, April 24). 
Being a crucial part of a major development initiative led by China, known as ‘One Belt, 
One Road’ (OBOR), to connect Asia with Europe, Africa and the Middle East, the CPEC is 
much linked to the hopes and interests, as well as to the regional and global geopolitics (Ze 
2014). However, such megaproject raises numerous questions, especially in regard of its 
feasibility (Wolf 2016, June 28). In order to achieve the implementation and smooth 
functioning of this mega-development project and to keep the flow of the respective 
Chinese investment going, three major pre-conditions have to be clearly addressed by the 
Pakistani government (Wolf 2016, June 28; March 16): Firstly, as China and other potential 
foreign donors require a terror and insurgency free Pakistan, peace, security and stability 
need to be achieved in the country and, in particular, in the areas hosting the CPEC 
infrastructure as well as other related projects.  
Secondly, creation of a healthy political environment, within which decision-making can 
draw on national harmony and consensus as additional source of legitimacy for a project 
which will have tremendous impacts on every sphere of the people’s life. In other words, 
domestic political rivalries, as well as unregulated and unrestricted struggles over 
distribution of the CPEC projects, resources and revenues, must be solved or avoided. 
Thirdly, efforts have to be made to achieve maximum connectivity for CPEC, and thus to 
open up the project for other neighbouring countries, especially Afghanistan (westward 
orientation) and India (eastward orientation). In some directions, Pakistan already 
underwent several substantial changes in order to fasten the CPEC development process. 
However, until now, Islamabad was not able to address the core demands to Beijing, such 
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as the creation of a favourable environment for the CPEC featured by national consensus 
and security.  
One of the greatest hurdles is the social, economic and political situation in the Federal 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the country’s most fragile, underdeveloped and 
neglected area in Pakistan (Zissis/Bajoria, Jayshree 2007, October 26). Even if the FATA 
territory does not represent a major constituent of the CPEC, all the developments – 
positive and negative – will have a crucial impact on the overall implementation and 
functioning of the CPEC. Therefore, the challenge of brining this area at par with the rest of 
the country must be seen as a sine qua non condition for a successful implementation of the 
CPEC project. In order to address this task, the government of Pakistan initiated a reform 
process for the FATA which will be here in focus.  
The CPEC Project: What does it mean for FATA?  
In theory, the advantages of the CPEC and its related projects could be manifold. From an 
economic point of view, the FATA would have a unique chance to receive significant 
amount of foreign capital. In other words, the CPEC comes at a time when there is a surge 
of major investments in Pakistan (Chang 2014, December 10) and in the FATA in particular. 
Through the integration of  FATA into the CPEC and the successful implementation of the 
respective projects, the tribal areas can hope to improve their infrastructure (mainly roads 
and railways), energy situation, and to generate a positive spill-over effect in all other 
economic sectors (Khan 2015, January).  
In this context, through building up the specific economic zones, FATA would not only 
become a part of a transit route for important commodities and raw materials, but it would 
also benefit from industrialisation and from the new manufacturing hubs. These hubs could 
then boost FATA’s underperforming economy and create new opportunities for 
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entrepreneurs (Brunner 2013). In addition, the CPEC would also help to effectively address 
the problem with the unemployment in the underdeveloped region.  
There is no doubt that the above mentioned economic opportunities would significantly 
influence the whole spectrum of the political and social life in the region. One may expect 
that both improvement of the relations between the FATA and other provinces and regions, 
together with better centre-state relations (Iqbal 2015, May 25), could possibly be achieved 
in future. Plus, a successful implementation of the CPEC would also improve the capacities 
of the central (civilian) government and its credibility among the local habitants. These two 
potential factors could effectively contribute to strengthen the governance of the FATA 
region. All this could potentially lead to a new international status and better regional 
standing of Pakistan based on the emergence of a ‘new economic self-confidence’.  
What is more, the Pakistani security establishment could also reassess its relationship with 
its neighbours, due to which the bilateral ties could be much improved in the future. Against 
this backdrop, FATA would certainly benefit from stronger economic and political 
cooperation with Afghanistan too. In addition, opening up of the CPEC towards India 
would boost India-Afghan trade via FATA. Last but not least, the extraordinary growth 
predictions will generate positive results for the common people (Rafi 2015, April 29). In 
this context, there is a great hope that the subsequent improvement of the living conditions 
would also help to eliminate the political radicalisation, Islamisation, militancy, and 
jihadism. Briefly speaking, the CPEC might also help with the eradication of the terrorism 
in Pakistan. However, the realities look quite different.  
The FATA Reform: An Assessment of the Current Process 
In order to address the ongoing challenge of the effective integration of the FATA, the 2016 
Reform Committee has been established. The five committee members – headed by the 
Special Advisor to the Pakistani Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sartaj Aziz – were 
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nominated on November 3, 2015. The Committee identified four different options (GoP 
2016, August) for reforms related to the future status of the FATA:  
I. To maintain the status quo, to introduce judicial/administrative reforms and to 
increase focus on the development activities;  
II. To create the FATA Council on the pattern of the Gilgit Baltistan (GB);  
III. FATA to become a separate province;  
IV. To merge FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
By mapping and assessing these four potential scenarios, the Committee as well as many 
analysts are aware of the fact that they have to take the following major determinants into 
account: Firstly, that the old ‘political agent system’ will not be able to remain. Secondly, 
after the weakening of the old political-administrative system and the traditional decision-
makers, the eradication of the parallel institutional structures of the militants, and the (up-
coming) withdrawal of the Pakistan Armed Forces, FATA will be featured with a power 
vacuum. Thirdly, FATA needs to develop a new system of governance to administer the 
area, and such decision should be made by the tribal communities themselves via 
referendum organized in each tribal area (IPS 2016).  
In order to make any of the new or reformed systems of governance within the FATA work, 
it is crucial to address the above mentioned determinant, and for that, there is an obvious 
need to ensure the local ownership and to achieve law and order. In fact, the enthusiasm and 
efforts to implement reforms within the FATA might seem as nothing new. However, a 
critical juncture was represented by the extension of the Political Parties Act (NDI 2011, 
August 15), and Adult Franchise to the FATA (Ali 2014, July 6), which resulted into greater 
political awareness and activism. As a result, various political and social groups including 
several political parties, the FATA diaspora, students and professionals, became active and 
started a campaign for the FATA reforms. Furthermore, the mass exodus (emerged in 
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reaction to the terror and counter-terror actions) and subsequent return of the FATA people 
back to their homeland, played a significant role in raising the demand for reforms too. 
Moreover, a new generation of tribal leadership with a progressive mind-set emerged in the 
region and started expressing interests for further reforms. In result, not only the call for 
reforms, but also realizing that any solution regarding the future of FATA needs to include 
the decision of the tribal communities themselves, and thus it must be clearly articulated. 
However, in regard of the official report by the FATA Reform Committee, it seems that the 
central government and also a significant part of the tribal communities favour the 
integration between the FATA and neighbouring Khyber (Pakhtunkhwa KPK), one of the 
four provinces of Pakistan (Mitra/Wolf/Schoettli 2006).  
The rationale given by the ‘pro-merger faction’ is that the individual agencies have their 
own economic, social and cultural links with the adjoining districts of KPK. Furthermore, 
FATA and KPK already established several administrative linkages as well as infrastructure 
(GoP 2016, August). In contrast, the report pointed out that the vertical connectivity 
between the Agencies in the FATA region is more or less non-existent. Moreover, the 
statements by the Committee claim that there are severe doubts about the ability of the 
FATA Agencies ‘to generate the required resources and trained manpower’ to run the whole 
region as a separate province. In addition, there are certain concerns that the set-up of the 
FATA as a separate political-administrative entity could lead to the loss of ‘the current 
advantages of its connections with KPK’ (GoP 2016, August). Taking these concerns into 
account, merging FATA with KPK in the context of the CPEC development present several 
opportunities as well as challenges:  
Problematic decision-making and Democratic deficit 
Clearly, the report indicates a ‘democratic deficit’ within the FATA reform process. Briefly 
speaking, the whole attempt of the political rearranging of the tribal areas can be described 
as purely elite-driven process featured by the mechanism of consulting and bargaining 
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between the national and local elites. Having this in mind, one must agree that there are 
certain critics claiming that the Committee lacks any representation from the region itself 
(IPS 2016). The trigger of the controversy is that the Committee was nominated by the 
federal government – by the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself – and not chosen by the 
local people (IPS 2016). This is quite surprising, since Mr. Sharif emphasizes that ‘the 
future of FATA will be decided according to the aspirations and wishes of the people of 
those areas’ (PMO 2016, August 26). As such, it became obvious that any decision imposed 
on the local people of the tribal areas will lack ownership and subsequently support. In 
result, any ‘reform’ which lacks the local ownership and legitimacy accepted by the tribal 
people will be most likely contra-productive and will at least provoke resistance. Strictly 
speaking, the people of FATA should be given the right to hold a referendum in order to 
express their vision of the future political and socio-economic trajectories of their region. 
Unsurprisingly, this aspect gains significance especially in the context of the CPEC 
development because, as mentioned above, China made clear that the overall harmony and 
consensus in the country has to be achieved. Besides, it is highly unlikely that the CPEC 
will run smoothly in the long run when there will remain some unresolved issues between 
the local population and the central government. 
However, currently there are no concrete signs that the central government in Islamabad is 
willing to organize such referendum. Instead, the Committee is convinced that the best 
vehicle to ‘ensure acceptability of the Reforms’ will be ‘to take recourse via the Parliament’ 
(NAS 2016b, September). Subsequently, the final report of the Committee has been 
presented to the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for onward approval by the Cabinet and then 
to be tabled in the National Assembly. In addition, the document was sent to all the chief 
ministers’ offices and to the chiefs of all the army forces for their feedback. The 
recommendations of the Committee are displayed through the Prime Minister Secretariat’s 
website. The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) has been asked to be 
prepared to deal with it. Moreover, the above mentioned institutions are also supposed to 
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call for and collect public feedback (Khan 2016, August 28). However, holding a 
referendum, the most important procedure of all, is not going to happen so soon.  
Bridging the gap in capacities, resources and skills 
There is an argument that the merger of FATA with KPK would help to bridge the present 
lack of the capabilities and skills among the tribesmen to run their own provincial 
government, and it would also better the implementation of the major development projects 
organized by the local people themselves. Apart from the fact that the local people have 
enough qualified human resources among themselves to run their own state of affairs, it is 
out of question that the actual institutional structures are severely weakened, and that most 
of the population is still internally displaced (Mahr 2016, March 16). In this context, it is 
stated that KPK possess relatively well established administrative structures (compared to 
FATA) and these structures could be easily extended into the tribal areas (GoP 2016, 
August) – instead of building-up a new ones from the scratch – and would help to improve 
the process of the  administrative mainstreaming. In sum, the KPK administration could fill 
these gaps with its institutional capabilities and human resources, and make sure that FATA 
will not only be merged with KPK, but will also be integrated into the CPEC project. Such 
a scenario would not only help KPK and FATA to deepen their existing linkages, but it 
would also boost the process of the reconstruction within the FATA itself, which is probably 
the most important aspect of all as the large segment of the tribesmen ‘want the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of their houses, shops and infrastructure before any major 
political reforms are initiated’ (GoP 2016, August). In this context, on should mention that 
China already pledged 129 billion USD to ensure a successful repatriation of the displaced 
people back to their homes in FATA and to build up necessary facilities in order to improve 
the social and economic conditions (NAS 2016a, September).  
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Enhanced inter- and intra-regional connectivity 
It is argued that the integration of FATA into the CPEC development schemes, and 
especially the subsequent building up of the infrastructure and establishment of the Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs), would help to create the connection between various agencies. 
Furthermore, with integrated infrastructure, stable political and security environment 
(terror-free), FATA would be able to provide extraordinarily useful ‘mini-corridor(s)’, and 
would thus improve the bilateral trade and economic cooperation between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, which would of course increase the overall effectivity of the CPEC.  
However, in order to improve the connection between both countries, the security within 
the FATA region must be fully achieved. This not only requires the normalization of the 
relations between Kabul and Islamabad, but also the implementation of the effective border 
management mechanisms in order to undermine cross-border terrorism. However, until 
now, the attempts to establish any kind of the border control already created several 
conflicts between the two South Asian states, even armed confrontation, like the exchange 
of fire at the border town Torkham in June 2016 and the following dispute over the 
construction of a barbed wire fence (Joshi 2016, June 21). Besides that, by following this 
line of argumentation, what should also be highlighted here is that the CPEC project has the 
potential to create enough economic performance and financial resources that it could allow 
FATA to operate as a separate province. In fact, this gained attention of many observers, 
since there are certain concerns that the KPK government ‘may not be able to spare 
adequate financial resources for the speedy socio-economic development of FATA’ (GoP 
2016, August). As such, one could state that a successful implementation of the CPEC 
featured by an effectively integrated FATA, might abet critics of the ‘FATA-KPK merger 
option’ to raise their demand to create a separate province for the tribal area. Nevertheless, 
the current relations between New Delhi and Islamabad worsen again after the Pakistan-
based terrorists – acting for the ‘good will’ and obviously supported by the Pakistani state – 
attacked the Indian military base located in the Jammu and Kashmir near the small town of 
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Uri (the third major attack in 2016) on September 18. Consequently, both India and 
Afghanistan (besides Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) decided not to join the upcoming SAARC 
meeting that was supposed to be held later in Pakistan. Occasions like this will most 
probably worsen the opportunity for the regional connectivity of the CPEC, and it will also 
have negative effects on the FATA’s opportunities for economic development and trade. 
Moreover, it will reduce the opportunity of the area to become a strategically well-placed 
border region as well. 
Rising regional leverage in FATA of the central government 
Besides the economic considerations regarding the future of FATA, there are no doubts that 
the ‘merger option’ will happen at the expense of the introduction of more federalism in 
Pakistan. Furthermore, the report is obviously formulated in an old rhetoric of the national 
elite, which causes couple of problems as the tribal communities live in remote areas, are 
often uneducated and still stuck in the ‘clutches of an old outdated system’ (Daily Times 
2016, September 8). The process of how the Committee was set up and how does the 
concrete decision-making currently works confirms the statement mentioned above. The 
integration of FATA into KPK does not refer to mainstreaming the region by bringing it at 
par with other provinces, but it actually means to bring the region under the control of the 
central government. In addition, for the smaller provinces of Balochistan and KPK, it is 
already highly unlikely to ensure their own, regional interests, vis-à-vis the central 
government in Islamabad. Being integrated into KPK, it will be even more difficult to 
formulate and induct their regional interests into the political-decision making and to get 
successfully recognized.   
Final Thoughts 
In sum, the idea of integrating FATA into KPK is primarily aimed at the successful 
establishment of the CPEC. The proclaimed goal by the central government of bringing 
FATA at par with other provinces regarding the political rights and socio-economic 
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indicators must be described as an element of a much larger development strategy. Having 
said this, it must be highlighted that there are several decisions made by the central 
government aiming to gain control over the area but not to grant remarkably more political 
leverage in the national or regional state of affairs to the local people. The fact that the 
Committee (working on behalf of the central government) creates recommendations for the 
potential FATA reforms with support from the selected local elites (which would of course 
benefit the FATA’s incorporation into CPEC) strengthens the idea of merging FATA with 
KPK. However, by shifting all other potential options and by exclusion of the common 
tribal people away (for example by ignoring a public referendum as decision-making 
mechanism) will not help to calm the situation in FATA.  
In contrast, it will have most likely severe consequences for Islamabad, since it shows one 
time more that is not able to ensure domestic stability and security in areas of conflict-
driven areas as well as to work out a national consensus and harmony. Both factors, security 
and peace are non-negotiable pre-conditions for the successful implementation of the CPEC 
project. In this context, the case of Sri Lanka shows how political conflict between different 
political factions (namely the new democratic government and the followers of the former 
authoritarian regime), over the allowance and implementation of the large Chinese 
infrastructure investment projects (Hambantota Port and international airport), have the 
potential to easily turn much promising ‘economic game changer’ into white elephants 
(Pattanaik 2015, June 5; Wolf 2013, March 24).  
At the moment, it seems that the Pakistani leadership is either unaware of such potential 
scenario, or is just ignoring it. However, China will definitely monitor the development of 
its economic corridor projects very carefully. Being less enthusiastic about the BCIM-EC, it 
is not astonishing that Beijing also actively cooperates with Iran in order to build up the 
infrastructure that would be able to offer access to the Middle East and Europe by land and 
sea. In view of this, Pakistan has to realize that the CPEC will not be able to function well 
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with unstable FATA, and hence needs to develop a healthy relationship with the local tribal 
communities. However, the way how the actual FATA reform process is operationalized 
seems rather deconstructive and gives a grim perspective for the FATA political future and 
successful economic integration in the CPEC. To conclude, it will be extremely difficult for 
the civilian society as well as for the military establishment of Pakistan to keep blaming the 
country’s unfortunate historical patterns determined by the disadvantageous colonial 
legacies and/or foreign hands, when the current FATA reform process is rather enhancing 
grievances and instability instead of ensuring harmony, local ownership and security.  
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